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OVERCOMING LOCHNER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: TAKING BOTH RIGHTS AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY SERIOUSLY AS WE SEEK TO SECURE
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND PROMOTE THE PUBLIC
GOOD
Thomas B. McAffee *
Professor McAffee reviews substantive due process as the textual
basis for modern fundamental rights constitutional decision-
making. He contends that we should avoid both the undue literal-
ism that rejects the idea of implied rights, as well as the attempt to
substitute someone's preferred moral vision for the limits, and
compromises, that are implicit in-and intended by-the Consti-
tution's text. He argues, moreover, that we can largely harmonize
the various goals of our constitutional system by taking rights se-
riously and by understanding that securing rights does not ex-
haust the Constitution's purposes.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now over one hundred years since the Supreme Court de-
cided Lochner v. New York, 1 and the case symbolizes, perhaps
more than any other, the modern debate over courts offering pro-
tection to unenumerated fundamental rights. In the contempo-
rary debate on constitutional interpretation, one school of thought
opposes the idea of implied rights, concluding they are the prod-
uct of undue judicial activism rooted in an anti-democratic elit-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Portions of this article are derived from chapter 7 of Powers Reserved for the People
and the States: A History of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (2006), which I co-authored
with The Honorable Jay S. Bybee, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and Professor Christopher Bryant, both former colleagues. The author acknowledges
support for research provided by the William S. Boyd School of Law, as well as Jesse Pan-
ofts research assistance. Also appreciated are Rob Correales's, a colleague, helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ism. 2 At the other end of the spectrum, those whom Professor
Bruce Ackerman has dubbed "rights foundationalists," contend
that "the American constitution is concerned, first and foremost,
with their protection."3 In their minds, "the whole point of having
rights is to trump decisions rendered by democratic institutions
that may otherwise legislate for the collective welfare."4 Though
it presents a confusing situation, rights foundationalists appear
to be divided into two very different, and surprisingly even war-
ring, groups. One group argues for a particular reading of Ameri-
can constitutional history and contends that the framing genera-
tion intended to secure all valid moral claims-rights-whether
they are found in the written Constitution or not.5 The other
group relies centrally on the Constitution's text and concludes
that, semantically, the document is most fairly read as securing
"equality" and "liberty"-moral concepts that interpreters appro-
priately read in an open-ended fashion.6 Remarkably enough,
though both groups contend for almost identical constructions of
the American Constitution, it is difficult to determine which
group perceives the other as the more unreasonable. 7 Inasmuch
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (1990); Rex E. Lee, Preserving Separation of Powers: A Rejection of Judicial
Legislation Through the Fundamental Rights Doctrine, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 805, 810-11
(1983).
3. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 11 (1991).
4. Id.; accord, Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 61, 92 (1996) (The "rights-foundationalist account of the Constitution has
potentially profound implications for our legal order, as well as for the practice of judicial
review.").
5. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 1-5 (2004); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS NAMED, AND UNNAMED 1-5 (1997); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 3-5, 13-17 (1995); Tho-
mas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975);
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127-28
(1987).
6. E.g., SOTIRIOUS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, at ix-xii
(1993); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7-12 (1996); Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 110 (1989).
7. Compare BLACK, supra note 5, at 3 (describing substantive due process as "para-
doxical, even oxymoronic"), JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (observing that because "there is simply no avoiding the fact
that the word that follows 'due' is 'process,'" it seems we "need periodic reminding that
'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness'"),
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 123 (2000) (observing that "the very phrase 'substantive due
process' teeters on self-contradiction," and hence "provides neither a sound starting point
nor a directional push to proper legal analysis"), and id. at 38 (concluding that during the
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as members of each group appear to rest their theory on an over-
whelming presumption in favor of a broad implication of an open-
ended system of rights, the tenacity of their disagreements is a
bit perplexing.
Lochner remains troubling to modern thinkers precisely be-
cause if there remains a rough consensus, even if sometimes
strenuously challenged, that something went wrong during the
Lochner era,8 there is no such consensus about exactly what went
Lochner era "judges generally underenforced the document-supported rights of blacks and
women while overenforcing various nondocumentarian claims of rich and powerful inter-
ests"), with RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 282 n.4 (2006) (arguing that "[tihose who
say that 'substantive due process' is an oxymoronic phrase, because substance and process
are opposites, overlook the crucial fact that a demand for coherence of principle, which has
evident substantive consequences, is part of what makes a process of decision making a
legal process"), DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 2 (contending that "contemporary constitutions
declare individual rights against the government in very broad and abstract language"
and that judges should "interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding
that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice"), Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS
IN THE MODERN STATE 381, 385-87 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (contending that
the Bill of Rights "consists of broad and abstract principles of political morality," which
encompass "all the dimensions of political morality that in our political culture can ground
an individual constitutional right"; and concluding that "the Constitution guarantees the
rights required by the best conceptions of the political ideals of equal concern and basic
liberty," which means opponents of unenumerated rights are merely "revisionists" who
"hope to curtail" the exercise of valid constitutional interpretive power), id. at 384 (the
purpose of critics of Dworkin's interpretation is to "turn the Bill of Rights from a constitu-
tional charter into a document with the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a stan-
dard form commercial lease"), id. at 386 (contending that even acknowledging the distinc-
tion between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights concedes too much to those who
claim that judges lack authority to add to the "enumerated"), Moore, supra note 6, at 123
(contending that, on his reading, "the only authoritative text ('law') for any legitimate de-
cisions, even Roe v. Wade, is the written document itself"), and Robert C. Post, The Su-
preme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 94 n.440 (2003) (concluding, based on the use of the word
"liberty" in the text of the Due Process Clause, that the Due Process Clause provides "as
much meaningful guidance as does the word 'equal' in the Equal Protection Clause").
8. Lochner clearly raised as many objections as virtually any case in American his-
tory; indeed, the case has become a symbol for an era that is often summed up as illustrat-
ing judicial derelection. See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAIN CLOTHES: A
THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 156, 235 n.l (2004) (acknowledging the
"infamy" involved when a "proper noun or a case becomes a verb," as in the charge of
"Lochnerizing"); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23
(1980) (viewing Lochner as "one of the most condemned cases in United States history"
and noting that judges who enforce economic due process "continue to receive adverse
treatment in the opinions and commentaries"); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (15th ed. 2004) ("[Its very name later became syn-
onymous with inappropriate judicial intervention in the legislative process."); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1473
(2005) (observing that "Lochner has become one of the most reviled Supreme Court cases
of all time"); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373
(2003) (describing Lochner as "one of the great anti-precedents of the twentieth century").
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wrong and its implications for contemporary constitutional adju-
dication. 9 Nevertheless, in the most recent era, the Supreme
Court has returned to its practice, going back to at least the turn
of the twentieth century, of imposing unenumerated fundamental
rights as limits on the powers of government.'° Perhaps because
this practice was widely associated with the Court's controversial
practice of limiting government's capacity to regulate the econ-
omy," many modern scholars have expressed enthusiasm about
devising an alternative justification. 12 In more recent years, how-
ever, several constitutional scholars have not only endorsed the
modern Court's revised fundamental rights jurisprudence, but
have advocated a return to the methodology of the Lochner era.'3
9. Thus in an article addressing this very question, Professor Strauss observes that
it is now "generally accepted . . . that the courts can properly recognize constitutional
rights that are not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution." Strauss, supra
note 8, at 375.
10. For general treatments of the heyday of economic substantive due process, some-
times called the "Lochner era," see Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth Klein-Levine & Thomas
B. McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions Revisited: Unwritten Constitutionalism in the
States, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 333, 371-92 [hereinafter Courts Over Constitutions Revisited];
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fun-
damental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 13, 31-35 (2003).
11. As we moved away from the New Deal Court crisis, and especially as the Court
moved away from its reliance on the Lochner era's economic substantive due process,
scholars began to look for alternative rationales for an expansive judicial role in discover-
ing and defining the scope of unnamed personal rights. An irony in all this is that one of
the leading critics of the Court relying on principles not found in the text of the Constitu-
tion, Professor Corwin, became the one who actually suggested that the scholarly search
for new rationales might lead to the Ninth Amendment. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152-53 (1928)
(finding that the Ninth Amendment takes "the principles of transcendental justice" and
translates them "into terms of personal and private rights"). In other works, of course,
Corwin clarified that he was opposed to courts basing individual rights decision-making on
unenumerated principles, whether derived from the Ninth Amendment or from unwritten
constitutionalism more generally. E.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A
STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 126-27 (1938).
12. The most popular alternative, embraced by constitutional scholars from the 1960s
to the present, centers on the Constitution's Ninth Amendment. Despite my best efforts,
proponents of modern fundamental rights jurisprudence justify that position by relying on
the Ninth Amendment. For the alternative perspective, see THOMAS B. MCAFFEE,
INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE
FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING 169-73 (2000) [hereinafter MCAFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS];
THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY
OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 225-26 (2006); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990).
13. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 5; RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 17-23 (1998); SIEGAN, supra note 8 (viewing Lochner as
.one of the most condemned cases in United States history" and noting that judges who
enforce economic due process "continue to receive adverse treatment in the opinions and
commentaries"); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453,
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Without question the Lochner decision-making era still has its
critics,14 but there is no consensus on precisely what went
wrong15 and whether one can adequately distinguish between
more recent variations on the unenumerated fundamental rights
theme. 6 Though it has flirted with other justifications, the mod-
ern Supreme Court has continued to rely on the Due Process
Clause to justify its fundamental rights jurisprudence. It is,
therefore, the Due Process Clause that is considered in this arti-
cle.
II. THE PERENNIAL STRUGGLE: SECURING PRIVATE RIGHTS
WHILE GUARANTEEING EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
PROMOTING THE PUBLIC GOOD
Surveying the work of the Constitutional Convention, James Madi-
son wrote, "Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a
very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stabil-
ity and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to
liberty and to the republican form." These are diverse elements of
454 (1985). For an overview of such perspectives, see Thomas B. McAffee, Substance Above
All: The Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitutionalists, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 501, 511-13 (1995).
14. E.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW
AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 194-97 (1998); Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring
the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law
and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1499-1500 [hereinafter
McAffee, Classical Legal Thought] (critiquing Barnett's Restoring the Lost Constitution:
The Presumption of Liberty).
15. For competing explanations of what "went wrong" during the Lochner era, see, for
example, ELY, supra note 7; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 750-55 (5th
ed. 2005); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 497-500; LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574-78 (2d ed. 1988); John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 522, 530 n.101 (1997) (describing
how the Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), relied on the example of a law
that takes property from A and gives it to B reflects that "the legislature was acting like a
court and hence was not giving the process due to the function being performed."); Strauss,
supra note 8, at 375, 381-86; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy]; Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926). In addition, compare David
E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003), with Cass R. Sunstein,
Reply, Lochnering, 82 TEX. L. REV. 65 (2003).
16. Though there is nothing like the consensus that something was deeply wrong with
Lochner, it remains true that more recent examples of fundamental rights substantive due
process have been intensely controversial. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Substantive Due
Process (Update 2), in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2576, 2577 (Leo-
nard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) (observing that modern courts have
been accused of using "subjective value judgments not tethered to the constitutional text").
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the public good; the task, Madison said, was one of "mingling them
together in their due proportions." The result was a balanced repub-
lic. Political balance or proportionality of this sort is not as exciting,
and perhaps not as easy to celebrate, as are the inspiring principles
of the Declaration of Independence. Yet the durability of those prin-
ciples has depended heavily on that sense of proportion which pro-
duced and which informs the Constitution. 17
The debate over whether the constitutional text must state a
right if that right is to be considered part of the supreme law of
the land, as well as discussion about the nature and ultimate
source of rights deemed to be implicit in the written Constitution,
has been with us from early in the American republic. As early as
1798, in Calder v. Bull, Justices Chase and Iredell confronted the
question of the role of constitutional text in establishing constitu-
tional rights. Is
In a presentation that was most clearly constitutional dictum,
Justice Chase articulated the view that the Constitution "must be
construed to contain implicitly all those individual rights that
would be essential terms of a fair social contract." 19 According to
Justice Chase, specific "vital principles" would "overrule an ap-
parent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law."2 ° Under Justice Chase's view,
our constitutional order precludes legislation that conflicts with
the requirements of a fair social contract "even if not 'expressly
restrained by the Constitution."'2
By contrast, Justice Iredell objected to the views of "some
speculative jurists" that the Supreme Court could invalidate a
law "merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the prin-
ciples of natural justice."22 Legislation that violates clear consti-
tutional provisions is "unquestionably void," Iredell reasoned, but
"[tihe ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard,"
17. Harry M. Clor, Reflections on the Bill of Rights, in OUR PECULIAR SECURITY: THE
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 153, 156 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. et
al., eds., 1993) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 233-34 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
18. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See generally Edward B. Foley, The Bicentennial of
Calder v. Bull: In Defense of a Democratic Middle Ground, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1599 (1998).
19. Foley, supra note 18, at 1599.
20. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) at 388 (emphasis omitted).
21. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1336-37 (3d ed. 2000) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387).
22. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 42:597
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so that the Court cannot invalidate a law with which it simply
disagrees.23
For Iredell, the response to the possibility of oppressive legisla-
tion was "to define with precision the objects of the legislative
power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries." 24 He thus opposed a judicial power to invalidate
laws on grounds of policy, which he read Justice Chase's opinion
as supporting, concluding that such actions were "not only un-
democratic and contrary to the English legal tradition we had in-
herited," but were "fundamentally inconsistent with the concept
of a written constitution."
25
Ironically enough, although Justice Chase's dictum appeared to
contemplate a willingness to go beyond the written Constitu-
tion,26 it is almost equally clear that "the limiting principles he
articulated seem to be drawn more from Whig understandings of
the British constitution than from doctrines of natural law and
natural right."27 Calder has come to stand, first and foremost, as
an example of the "doctrine of vested rights," which Professor Ed-
ward Corwin described as "the foundational doctrine of constitu-
tional limitations in this country."2' Notwithstanding the fact
that modern critics of the vested rights doctrine contend that it
rests ultimately not on the written Constitution, but on "the the-
ory of fundamental and inalienable rights,"29 it is equally true
that the doctrine "grew out of a recognition that when legisla-
tures act like courts, the potential for abuse grows not only by the
omission of some particular procedure in question-such as trial
23. Id. at 399. For Iredell, it was sufficient to justify the conflicting position that
"when there is disagreement among citizens concerning the content of a fair social con-
tract, there is no way to know for sure who has the correct view." Foley, supra note 18, at
1599.
24. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
25. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 47 (1985).
26. For careful analysis of John Hart Ely's attempt to reduce Justice Chase's argu-
ment to one based on a positivist reading of the Constitution's text, see Courts Over Con-
stitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 348-49.
27. Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Con-
stitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 107, 130 n.73 (1992) [hereinafter McAffee, Prolegom-
ena].
28. Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARv. L. REV. 366, 375 (1911).
29. Id.
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by jury-but also by the departure from separation of powers."3 °
Even if the vested rights doctrine involved the Supreme Court in
the process of finding "implied rights," the implication grew di-
rectly out of the purposes for creating three branches of govern-
ment and separating their powers. It did not have to lead the
Court to its modern doctrine of implied fundamental rights. In
fact, the modern doctrine of implied fundamental rights directly
contradicts the understanding of constitutionalism articulated
during the debate over the ratification of the Constitution.31
Even prior to the Court's decision in Calder v. Bull,3 2 it was al-
ready apparent that the American system was more successful in
creating a meaningful system of collective self-government than it
was at securing all the rights the people were entitled to and as-
suring the equal status of all citizens before the law. The most
obvious reason for this result was the compromise at the constitu-
tional convention to permit slave-holding states to continue the
institution of slavery. 33 Perhaps another reason was the recogni-
tion by the Constitution's Framers that, although constitutions
should attempt to set forth immutable principles, they inevitably
will fall short and, therefore, a method of amending them should
be supplied. 34 Early in the nation's history, moreover, the state
constitutions' declarations of rights presumed the qualified na-
ture of individual rights guarantees and, partly for that very rea-
son, frequently relied "on language of obligation and of state-
ment[s] of principle-language that itself suggests something
other than a hard legal rule-rather than the language of direct
30. Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 382; accord, JOHN V. ORTH,
DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 49-50 (2003) (observing that, although the Court
began with the proposition that the violation of vested rights effectively denied procedural
due process through the denial of "a judicial proceeding," it was also clear that "another
meaning lurked, redistributive and substantive," the consequence being the doctrine of
substantive due process); Harrison, supra note 15, at 522; Wallace Mendelson, A Missing
Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125, 136 (1956) (recognizing sepa-
ration of powers as the "narrow" bridge between procedural due process and the doctrine
of vested rights).
31. See, e.g., Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 336; Thomas B.
McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The Four-
teenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
747, 748-51 (2001) [hereinafter McAffee, Inalienable Rights].
32. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
33. McAffee, Classical Legal Thought, supra note 14, at 1579.
34. See MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 22-23; Philip A. Hamburger,
The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 300-01 (1989).
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command and prohibition."" Courts became engaged in a serious
practice of judicial review only gradually and during the nation's
first century, somewhat occasionally.
During the nation's first century, the institution of human
slavery, a central compromise in the drafting of the original Con-
stitution,36 had at least two dramatic forms of impact on the proc-
ess of limiting government. The first was that it required the
omission of rights from the Constitution that might threaten the
existence of slavery.37 Illustrative is the history of George Ma-
son's proposed "natural equality" in the Virginia Bill of Rights.
The proposal stated that "all men are by nature equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent rights."" Fearful of the
potential impact of the provision on the constitutionality of slav-
ery, the following language was added: "of which, when they enter
into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or di-
vest their posterity."39 This language "was included precisely in
order to clarify that the fundamental rights that people retain as
they enter civil society did not apply to the Black race because the
slaves had never entered into a state of civil society in Virginia."4°
Regarding the Federal Constitution, there is no room for doubt
that "[t]he Founders deliberately omitted the Declaration [of In-
dependence's] doctrine of equal rights from the Bill of Rights, not
because that doctrine was considered mere rhetoric, but because
its inclusion in the Constitution would have been dangerous to
35. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 24.
36. For an attempt to summarize the original compromise and to briefly describe its
impact on the nation's constitutional practice, see McAffee, Classical Legal Thought, supra
note 14, at nn.396-416 and accompanying text.
37. See McAffee, Classical Legal Thought, supra note 14, at 1579.
38. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1 (emphasis added), reprinted in 7 THE FED-
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 3812, 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS]. The proposal was obviously related to Thomas Jefferson's assertion of the "self-
evident" truth "that all men are created equal." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
39. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1 (emphasis added), reprinted in STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 38, at 3812-13.
40. Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the Declaration of
Independence?, 1 NEV. L.J. 138, 149-50 (2001) (citing Warren M. Billings, "That All Men
are Born Equally Free and Independent": Virginians and the Origins of the Bill of Rights,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 335, 339-40 (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminski eds., 1992)).
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the continued existence of slavery."41 As a consequence, the very
content of the Federal Bill of Rights-including both what was
inserted and what was omitted-was affected by "the taint of
America's greatest evil, race slavery."
42
Second, the need to accommodate slavery prompted some to
oppose the application of private rights to the extent that exercise
of private rights might be deleterious to the slavery institution.
An example is the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech.43 Among those whose free speech interests were system-
atically suppressed in nineteenth-century America were "[r]adical
abolitionists [who] insisted that the sinful and coercive laws of
the state placed barriers between individuals and God's 'higher
law.' 44 By the 1830s Southern states began "banning antislavery
speech and demanding that the North follow suit."45 Legal doc-
trines that permitted suppression of speech interests early in the
nation's history carried over until the "bad tendency" doctrine
and the "constructive intent" doctrine were used to justify prose-
cutions of abolitionists on grounds that their words could lead to
slave revolts.46
Of course, the protection courts offered to individual rights in
the nineteenth century, quite apart from securing the institution
of human slavery, was not close to what has become commonplace
in the twentieth century.47 It can be accurately asserted that "no
right of free speech as we know it existed, either in law or prac-
tice, until a basic transformation of the law governing speech dur-
ing the period from about 1919 to 1940." 4s Before that time, "one
41. Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independ-
ence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1993).
42. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 117 (2001).
43. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE:"
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 117-54 (2000).
44. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 24 (1997).
45. CURTIS, supra note 43, at 117.
46. David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 190, 196 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
47. Professor Rabban notes a "pervasive judicial hostility to virtually all free speech
claims" prior to World War I. RABBAN, supra note 44, at 2. Those of a progressive political
orientation "challenged traditional conceptions of individual rights protected by the Con-
stitution" prior to World War I, associating constitutional rights "with the excessive indi-
vidualism to which they attributed the destructive inequality and division they saw
throughout American society." Id. at 3.
48. Kairys, supra note 46, at 191.
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spoke publicly only at the discretion of local, and sometimes fed-
eral, authorities, who often prohibited what they or influential
segments of the community did not want to hear."49
A classic early example is the criminal conviction of the evan-
gelist Reverend William F. Davis, a "longtime active opponent of
slavery and racism,"5" for preaching the gospel on Boston Com-
mon.51 The conviction was based on a city ordinance "that prohib-
ited 'any public address' on public grounds without a permit from
the mayor."52 Though the twentieth-century Supreme Court
would recognize public parks, sidewalks, and streets as "public
forums," which means the state must provide significant reasons
to limit speech opportunities,53 the decision in Davis underscores
"that there was no tradition of or legally protected right to free
speech as we know it prior to the transformation."54 To the extent
that a given right could be linked to supporting and reinforcing
the role of the people in a democratic system, it was more likely to
receive fairly substantial support from both commentators and
courts .
A. Popular Sovereignty and Its Implications for Rights
Popular sovereignty was the basis of the Federalist founders'
confidence in the proposed Federal Constitution, including its
omission of a bill of rights.56 Those most responsible for the adop-
tion of the Constitution believed that a well-structured govern-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 192.
51. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895).
52. Kairys, supra note 46, at 192. Judge Holmes reasoned that to forbid public speak-
ing "in a highway or public park" no more infringes individual rights "than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house." Davis, 39 N.E. at 113. His opinion was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in 1897. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48
(1897).
53. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 387-89 (2d ed. 1996).
54. Kairys, supra note 46, at 194.
55. Rabban observes, for example, that "most commentary on the Sedition Act of 1798
has criticized it for punishing legitimate political speech and has often added that it vio-
lated the First Amendment," bringing us to the point where increasingly "people argued
that the role of speech in a democracy requires First Amendment protection of dissenting
opinions by unpopular minorities." RABBAN, supra note 44, at 13.
56. See, e.g., Gregory S. Ahern, Virtue, Wisdom, Experience, Not Abstract Rights,
form the Basis of the American Republic, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ahernl.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
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ment that adequately represented the people was the ultimate
security for the rights they held.5 7 The Federalists not only be-
lieved that the federal government simply had not been granted
sufficient power to threaten basic rights, but they were also con-
fident that the well-recognized power of the people to "alter or
abolish" their form of government meant the Constitution could
be amended if in some important way it was ineffective."8
Fortunately, as participants in the process of constitution-
making and amending have discovered, "the people" who have at-
tended American constitutional conventions have essentially felt
compelled to adopt general rules that they know will be applied
uniformly to both friends and foes. This has also meant in prac-
tice, however, that if the people as a collective entity "shared" or
"assumed the validity of' particular assumptions or prejudices,
the net result could be the inclusion of a constitutional provision
or adoption of a constitutional amendment that was at best
"short-sighted"-or at worst fundamentally unjust.59 Though the
founding generation believed in a moral reality from which one
might derive certain basic rights claims, they had just witnessed
the English ignore-nay, even abuse-the columnists' "rights of
57. Ultimately "the proper guardians of rights are the people-whose sovereignty con-
stitutes the most basic right of all." GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 153 (1989); accord, JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISA-
GREEMENT 244 (1999) (contending that if the question framed is "who shall decide what
rights we have," his answer is, "The people whose rights are in question have the right to
participate on equal terms in that decision," and also supplying reasons for concluding
that we should not "instead entrust final authority to a scholarly or judicial elite").
58. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 383-
84 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (James Wilson stated that "We the People" is "tantamount to
a volume and contains the essence of all the bills of rights that have been or can be de-
vised."); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 578-79 (contend-
ing that the Constitution, in expressly stating the doctrine of popular sovereignty-"We
the People"--and thereby acknowledging the authority of the people to amend the Consti-
tution to better meet their needs and to secure their rights, "is a better recognition of
popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several
of our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than
in a constitution of government").
59. See, e.g., Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 355-57 & 356
n.115 (citing G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 106, 108 (1998)) (de-
scribing American constitutional provisions that denied free Blacks-not to mention Chi-
nese residents and Mormons-the right to vote, imposed property-owning requirements to
make one eligible to vote, conditioned holding public office on one's status as a Protestant
or being a non-minister, and safeguarded the institution of slavery). See generally CONSTI-
TUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford
Levinson eds., 1998).
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Englishmen," and therefore held no illusions that rights were
"automatically" secured against government invasion.6"
The nation's experience with state constitutions does quite a
bit to confirm the basic validity of Madison's insight that liberty
was more likely to receive security and protection from the na-
tional government in an extended republic than from state gov-
ernments.61 One of the ironies at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury was that a relatively activist Supreme Court did a great deal
to reinvigorate the nation's system of individual rights, but did so
at the cost of declining to implement the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments' purpose to assure every citizen equal status
under law 62-a step that seemed at least implicit in the Declara-
60. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 120 (Based on their shared experi-
ence, "the opposing camps" in the debate over ratification of the proposed Constitution,
"shared remarkably similar premises that it was important that the Constitution secure
the fundamental natural rights and that the natural rights did not operate as inherent,
enforceable limitations on government power."); Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights,
Social Contract Theory and the Rights "Retained" by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L. J. 267, 276
(1992) ("Antifederalist opponents of the proposed Constitution, did not believe that their
fundamental rights were inherent features of legal and constitutional orders, whether or
not found in the written Constitution"); id. at 285-87 (Federalists shared with Antifederal-
ists "the same basic assumptions about the relationship between the written Constitution,
natural rights, and social contract theory;" but they contended that all rights were secured
under the Constitution because "the government thereby contemplated was designed to
accomplish a limited number of specific national objects," reserving all else to the people.).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 57, 64 (Noxious fac-
tions are "united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity, " and experience shows that "the same advantage, which a Republic has over a De-
mocracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic,"
and hence "the Union over the States composing it."); see also DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE PO-
LITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 102 (1984) (describing Federalist 10 as "an implicit
indictment of the states," which "begins by citing complaints against 'our governments'-
at least primarily our state governments-and concludes by showing the superiority of the
'large... republic' constituted by a new government for the Union" and noting that Madi-
son's conviction about the states "is why Madison proposed to the Constitutional Conven-
tion that the national legislature be given a veto over state acts; and it was in support of
that proposal that Madison presented the arguments of Federalist 10").
62. The same Supreme Court that brought us Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, also brought us the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 174 (1999)
(contending that the "federal judiciary's complicity in the turn-of-the century's system of
racial oppression should serve as a warning of the political possibilities once an unwaver-
ing focus on the Constitution's terms and purposes is lost"); Amar, supra note 7, at 38 (ob-
serving that "judges generally underenforced the document-supported rights of blacks and
women while overenforcing various nondocumentarian claims of rich and powerful inter-
ests"); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism versus Justice in Plainclothes:
Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1436-37 (2005) (concluding that "[t]he
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tion of Independence and was the central purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment.63
B. The Right to Pursue the Public Weal and the Rights of
Individuals
Americans of the founding era were deeply committed to indi-
vidual rights, which typically consisted of what we call negative
rights-freedom from. Modern Americans sometimes do not un-
derstand that the American founders were also committed to
"positive liberty," referring to "the liberty of the citizens of a self-
governing society to participate and act for the public good and to
use their government to seek, in Aristotle's words, 'not merely life
alone, but the good life."'64 From the perspective of its framers,
the Federal Constitution was concerned most with the puzzle of
how to combine these factors together-how to create a truly re-
publican form of government, whereby the people might govern
themselves, that simultaneously respected and implemented the
moral claims ("rights") of individual members of that society.65 As
Americans contemplated their first Constitution, it was clear that
representative government had a well-deserved reputation for not
respecting rights-a reputation that had been confirmed in many
minds by the American experience under state constitutions
adopted during the confederation period.66
John Adams, the author of the Massachusetts Constitution, the
document with the largest impact on the substantive content of
the proposed Federal Constitution, was extremely clear that
"happiness of society is the end of government .... From this
Court diminished the scope of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' guarantees of
fundamental rights, of Congress's power to enforce the rights they secured, and of Con-
gress's power to remedy their violation"-thereby undermining the "justice-seeking and
rights-protecting Constitution" and creating a "moral anomaly" in our constitutional law).
63. See, e.g., Reinstein, supra note 41, at 392.
64. RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 40 (1993).
65. See MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 45.
66. Historically, it was clear that "popular government has a bad reputation which it
has fully earned by its history of instability, injustice, and failure." EPSTEIN, supra note
61, at 5. "The confederation period, 1776-1787, was characterized by a continuing dialogue
over how to resolve the tension between government by consent and the idea of limited
government that preserved liberty." MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 45.
The result was that "reformers advocated constitutional change by contending against the
degree of power granted to the legislative branches and the failure to provide satisfactory
mechanisms for checking and limiting that power." Id. at 47.
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principle it will follow, that the form of government which com-
municates ease, comfort, security, or, in one word, happiness, to
the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the
best."67 Given that the Framers held a realistic-not an idealis-
tic-view of human nature, their goal of seeking the good of soci-
ety and the happiness of its members reflected that they were
hopeful without being perfectionists.6" The goal was to strike a
reasonable "balance between liberty and authority" with each in-
dividual surrendering "enough control over his original rights to
permit government to maintain an organized, stable, peaceful
pattern of human relations."69 Consequently "eighteenth-century
values of natural rights never totally supplanted the seventeenth-
century American belief in a community held together by sub-
stantive values reflected in moral legislation."7 Indeed, when
James Madison offered his proposed Bill of Rights to the first
Congress, he explained that he had included only "those safe-
guards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed
between them and the magistrate who exercised the sovereign
power."7
The themes that grew out of the positive liberty conceptions of
the founding generation may have been key to American avoid-
ance of excessive individualism, which is a result of a society ex-
clusively focused on adequately securing Lockean individual
rights.72 Thus a modern commentator suggests that the notion of
67. CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 414 (1953) (quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 193
(Charles Francis Adams & Co. ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1865)). James Wilson stated that
"the happiness of the society is the first law of every government." Id. at 410-11 (quoting
3 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 206 (Bird Wilson ed., Philadel-
phia, Lorenzo Press 1804)). Also, James Iredell stated that "[t]he object of all government
is, or ought to be, the happiness of the people governed." Id. at 411 (quoting 1 GRIFFITH J.
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 217 (1949)).
68. See ROSSITER, supra note 67, at 442-43.
69. Id.
70. David F. Forte, Ideology and History, 13 GEO. L. REV. 1501, 1507 (1979).
71. JAMES MADISON, ADDRESS OF 8 JUNE 1789, reprinted in XI DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FIRST SESSION: JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, at 818, 821 (Charlene
Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
72. Working from the assumption of plenary state legislative powers, in the nine-
teenth century "Americans resorted to law to promote public safety, stimulate economic
development, police public spaces, control morals, protect public health, and in general
promote collective welfare. They did not waste a moment's concern about overriding indi-
vidual interests in doing so." WIECEK, supra note 14, at 68. See generally FRANK BOURGIN,
THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1989);
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
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an early American republic as a kind of laissez-faire utopia is
simply a myth:
In reality, antebellum Americans took seriously the maxim salus
populi suprema lex esto (let the welfare of the people be the supreme
law), and used governmental regulation pervasively to promote the
people's welfare. Powerful local self-government was the norm, not
only in the long settled East, but all along the frontiers as well. Law
was central in this thoroughly regulated social order, identifying the
loftiest ideals of the people as well as prescribing the minutiae of
their social intercourse. The doctrine of the police power provided the
all-pervasive reality of government presence in antebellum Amer-
ica.
An aspect of America's lack of a libertarian heritage is its con-
sistent dedication to the idea that one purpose of government is to
develop or promote a public morality. Even at a time when the
Supreme Court was generally more solicitous to Tenth Amend-
ment claims of state rights, it upheld a federal statute prohibiting
the use of channels of interstate commerce in prostitution. The
Court concluded that the national government could act "to pro-
mote the general welfare, material and moral. 74 Similarly, in
upholding a federal ban on lotteries, the Court affirmed the gov-
ernment's power "to protect the public morals."75 Chief Justice
Warren, who presided over what many characterize as a constitu-
tional revolution, recognized as a long established principle "the
right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent soci-
ety.
76
American political and legal traditions are complex. One schol-
arly treatment recognizes at least three "central strands of our
culture-biblical, republican, and modern individualist."77 The re-
publican cultural strand refers to "a devotion to political self-
government and the requisite virtues of public spirited citizen-
ship; that is, the recognition that authentic self-government re-
quires citizens with a responsible concern for public affairs and
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
73. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 68.
74. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
75. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903).
76. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
77. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 28 (1985).
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willingness . . . to subordinate private interests thereto.""8 Ac-
cording to Professor Harry Clor:
[iun the formative years of the Republic and throughout much of the
nineteenth century, the biblical and republican strands provided a
delimiting moral and cultural context for American liberalism. Be-
cause of these two influences upon it, our individualism was con-
strained by ideas of obligation to community; "both of these tradi-
tions placed individual autonomy in a context of moral and religious
obligation that in some contexts justified obedience as well as free-
dom."...
[Olur Lockean and Madisonian liberalism has had to make room for
opposing influences both civic and religious. 
79
III. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS A SOURCE FOR
EVALUATING GOVERNMENT INTRUSION
When judges base their decisions either on constitutional text or on
longstanding consensus, they do not usurp the right of the people to
self-government, but hold the representatives of the people account-
able to the deepest and most fundamental commitments of the peo-
ple.
... To be sure, there can be bad, evil, or counterproductive tradi-
tions; but if so, one would expect to see a movement away from them.
At least, there is more reason to have faith in the product of decen-
tralized decisions, based on experiments and experience over a pe-
riod of many years, than in the abstract theorizing of particular indi-
viduals, even oneself. Imposition of a new, untried, principle will
almost certainly have unintended and unpredictable consequences,
which is why prudent statesmen are guided by experience rather
than by idealistic speculation.
8 0
The Court has adopted the view that liberty interests are se-
cured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Even so, during most of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court underscored that the security given to rights by the Due
78. HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY,
LAw AND PORNOGRAPHY 30 (1996).
79. Id. at 30-31 (quoting BELLAH ET AL., supra note 77, at 142-43).
80. Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 665, 682-83.
81. Id. at 666, 670.
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Process Clause did not require the Court to engage in creative ef-
forts to "discover" rights; it merely had to secure rights that were
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."82 Notwithstanding the
Court's preference for due process liberty, however, most com-
mentators have not shared the enthusiasm. Thus even a modern
advocate of unenumerated fundamental rights has concluded that
"the very phrase 'substantive due process' teeters on self-
contradiction," and hence "provides neither a sound starting point
nor a directional push to proper legal analysis."83 And another
advocate of unenumerated fundamental rights decision-making
has described substantive due process as "paradoxical, even oxy-
moronic."84 Without so much as an explanation of how the Court's
construction of due process fundamental rights could trump other
public interests, or in any way relate to the intention to preserve
a right to fair process, the Court has essentially abandoned any
attempt to explain how the guarantee has come to play the role it
does. 85
A. The Case for Substantive Due Process-Perceiving Legislatures
as Not the Only Source of the Law of the Land
Although "substantive due process has been the victim of mer-
ciless criticism," it still remains "the most plausible justification
for finding rights not clearly or explicitly set forth in [constitu-
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1988)
(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
83. Amar, supra note 7, at 123; see also id. at 122-23 (describing recent unenumer-
ated rights cases as "invoking the nonmammalian whale of substantive due process, a
phantasmagorical beast conjured up by judges without clear textual warrant"). Pushing
the point further, Justice Thomas went so far as to contend that the only reason the Court
could not properly reevaluate the area of unenumerated fundamental rights was "that nei-
ther party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and
that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement
of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. BLACK, supra note 5, at 3; see also ELY, supra note 7, at 18 (contending that be-
cause "there is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process,'" it
appears we "need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in
terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness'").
85. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Constitution as Based on the Consent of the Gov-
erned-Or, Should We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 80 OR. L. REV. 1245, 1273 n.129
(2001) [hereinafter McAffee, Consent of the Governed]. See generally Harrison, supra note
15.
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tional] text." 6 Indeed, from the beginning, the commitment to re-
quiring compliance with due process of law, and keeping the gov-
ernment within the "law of the land," has not been limited to re-
quiring compliance with acts of Parliament, but included common
law and customary conceptions of law. 7 Well before the American
Revolution, Lord Coke wrote that the granting of an economic
monopoly "is against the liberty and freedom[ I of the subject,"
and, consequently, such a grant was "against this great charter
[-Magna Carta].""8
Unsurprisingly then, it was antebellum state courts that inter-
preted due process to restrain "arbitrary deprivations of prop-
erty," and it was also during this period that courts began to per-
ceive due process as "establishing equal treatment as a
constitutional norm" and prohibiting laws "which aided one class
of individuals" to the detriment of others.8 9 The clause thus be-
came a means of reinforcing customary limits on political power.
Even if the Due Process Clause does not convey an extremely nar-
row or concrete limitation, but actually serves to reinforce cus-
tomary limits on political power, it should not be read as effec-
tively establishing the Constitution's enforceable "inalienable
rights" clause.9"
86. See Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 387-92.
87. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 6, 9-14 (2003);
FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND
NONSENSE 10, 12-13 (1986); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and
Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT 315, 320-21
(1999); John V. Orth, Taking From A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process and the
Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT 337, 337-38 (1997); Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 951, 960-61, 968, 986.
88. STRONG, supra note 87, at 11 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809). The modern American tendency
has been to assume that the founders of the American Constitution were deeply commit-
ted to abstract moral claims and wrote them into the Constitution. But the Cokeian
model-rooted as much in custom and tradition as it was in "reason"-was much more
deeply entrenched in American constitutional thought than any commitment to abstract
natural rights. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 174-76.
89. Ely, Jr., supra note 87, at 336, 338.
90. The central objections to so conceiving the Supreme Court's role are both episte-
mological and institutional. It is, in the first place, unclear that the Court is up to the task
of demonstrating that the rights it would enforce are "decreed" by God or nature. Cf STE-
VEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 25 (1998); Ronald J. Allen,
Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and Epistemological Modesty, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 436, 439 (1993). Beyond the history showing that such open-ended power
was never intended to be given to the Supreme Court, 'commentators have noted that in
modern cases raising the most challenging political-moral questions-especially those on
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The history of substantive due process adjudication can be read
either as a genuine grappling with text and history or as a "free-
ing" of the judiciary from any obligation to either.9' It is difficult
to quarrel with Justice White's contention that "the substantive
content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the
accumulated product of judicial interpretation."92 The require-
ment of due process of law bases to some degree constitutional
claims on the legal order itself. That order's establishment of ex-
pectations through common law or statutory rulings become the
source of these claims.93 It is part of our constitutional tradition
that authoritatively adopted judicial decisions may be embraced
by the nation as a whole and become a settled part of our consti-
tutional order. 9" In embracing a long-established judicial doc-
abortion, homosexuality, and the right to die-the treatment of the core moral questions
have been unenlightening at best." McAffee, Consent of the Governed, supra note 85, at
1289; see also infra note 131.
91. See generally Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 371-92. If we
are not careful, we could turn the Due Process Clause into the "Life, Liberty, or Property
Clause" as judges create and impose their own notions of what should be inalienable
rights.
92. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); ac-
cord Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 77-
78 (2006) (concluding that there is a lack of evidence suggesting that substantive due
process was "embraced by the original, objective public meaning of the clause," with the
implication that its values "emerge from a process of nonoriginalist decisionmaking);
Harrison, supra note 15, 494-95.
93. An example is presented by Cruzan's reliance on the long-established common law
right to refuse even necessary medical care-as a basis for acknowledging a right to decide
on medical care relating to death. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-
69 (1990); see McConnell, supra note 88, at 174.
94. See Michael J. Perry, What is "the Constitution"? (and Other Fundamental Ques-
tions), in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 99, 105 (Larry Alexander
ed., 1998); accord Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Tex-
tualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2414 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)) (observ-
ing that "most originalist judges recognize the need for a consistent, coherent doctrine of
respect for settled precedent"). Elsewhere I have clarified my own view that despite our
commitment "to the idea of a fixed and written Constitution, as well as to the idea of objec-
tive interpretation," it remains imperative to recall that "fallible human beings will im-
plement those ideals." Thomas B. McAffee, Brown and the Doctrine of Precedent: A Con-
curring Opinion, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 99, 100 (1995) [hereinafter McAffee, Brown]. Though
some have suggested that one cannot reconcile commitment to objective or original mean-
ing with a similar commitment to well-established precedent, the reality is "Supreme
Court Justices have seldom purported to be anything other than originalists, and they
have always struggled with the question of precedent." Thomas B. McAffee, The Role of
Legal Scholars in the Confirmation Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees-Some Reflec-
tions, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 211, 237 (1991); see id. at 236-38 (describing the
complexity of the issue between originalism and precedent and citing the work of Professor
Henry P. Monaghan to illustrate that originalists can be strongly committed to precedent);
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trine, and applying it with relatively modest ends in mind, we are
a long way from endorsing "the simplistic slogan that the Consti-
tution means what this Court says it means."95 Thus, it may be
that the doctrine of precedent will justify reading the Due Process
Clause as protecting life, liberty, and property against arbitrary
deprivations and as establishing equal treatment as an enforce-
able constitutional norm. But neither historical evidence nor the
doctrine of precedent support empowering courts to engage in the
moral analysis required to "discover," and then to impose, natural
and inalienable rights and subjecting laws impacting on such
rights to the strictest forms of judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has often viewed itself as governed by the
proper understanding of the traditions of our law rather than by
moral abstractions.96 As Judge Michael McConnell wrote, this
"'traditionalist' approach holds that the open-ended, normative
language of the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the
long-standing legal practices and traditions of the nation."97 Writ-
ing for a plurality in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Justice
Powell clarified that "an approach grounded in history imposes
limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based
on the abstract formula taken from Palko v. Connecticut, and ap-
parently suggested as an alternative."98 As the Court itself ex-
pressed in Washington v. Glucksberg:
The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from
abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our
see also Larry Alexander, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUND-
ATIONS 1, 5 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (observing that thoughtful originalists recognize
"a role to Supreme Court precedents that conflict with original intent").
95. McAffee, Brown, supra note 94, at 100. For a compelling argument that giving ef-
fect to well-established precedent can adequately establish the "legal" legitimacy of the
Court's action, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1821-24 (2005). Many agree "that precedent contributes to the predictability
and continuity of constitutional law," and that the Court's decision-making about overrul-
ing precedent has frequently required "erroneous reasoning and some other serious flaw
justifying overruling, including unworkability and inconsistencies with case law." Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 68, 77, 145 (1991).
96. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977).
97. McConnell, supra note 88, at 174.
98. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 n.12 (citation omitted); accord MILTON R. KONVITz, FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 116 (2001).
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assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and
constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the as-
sistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the deci-
sion to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed
similar legal protection.
99
Judge McConnell suggested that the approach articulated in
Glucksberg would likely yield a more cautious, incremental
analysis of fundamental rights.10 0 "The traditionalist approach,"
observed McConnell, "is inductive and experiential" and "reasons
up from concrete cases.""' The Court itself seeks to avoid over-
generalization: "That many of the rights and liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, in-
timate, and personal decisions are so protected .. .. "",02 Conclud-
ing that fundamental rights must be either textually based or
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,' ' 1°" the Court clarified that its task is to determine whether
government has acted arbitrarily by invading an interest that so-
ciety has come to view as fundamental, not what the Justices are
persuaded should be fundamental.104
B. The Lochner Era: What Went Wrong?
1. Literalism and "Unenumerated" Rights
A strong consensus remains that the Lochner-era Court was
profoundly wrong, but we have lost, if we ever had, a consensus
about precisely how the Court went wrong. Some have suggested
that the crux of the problem was that the right recognized in
99. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reads this as-
pect of Glucksberg as stating good law, notwithstanding the intervening decision of the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See Williams v. Attorney Gen.,
378 F.3d 1232, 1234-37 (11th Cir. 2004).
100. McConnell, supra note 80, at 672.
101. Id. This approach differs from the ,"moral philosophic approach," which tends to be
"deductive and theoretical, deriving specific prescriptions from more general theoretical
propositions." Id. By contrast, the more tradition-oriented approach is the "heir to legal
realism: cautious, empirical, flexible, skeptical of claims of overarching theory." Id.
102. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (citation omitted); accord Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235;
Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-17 (11th Cir.
2004).
103. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
104. McConnell, supra note 80, at 670-71.
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Lochner-"liberty of contract"-was not enumerated in the Con-
stitution itself.10 5 This argument from text-or the "lack of' rele-
vant text-is often associated with the views of Justice Black and
is easily characterized as reflecting a "kind of literalism.""°6 At
first blush, this criticism seems especially powerful inasmuch as
Justice Black was well-known for a certain kind of literalism-
some of his fame came from his First Amendment insistence that
"no law" means "no law."1 °7
Despite Justice Black's invocation of the First Amendment's
language along these lines ("no law means NO LAW"), he con-
ceded that "speech pursued as an integral part of criminal con-
duct was beyond first amendment protection."' ° Justice Black's
literalistic tendencies have not stood as a barrier to his accep-
tance of the reasonable implications of the rights expressly se-
cured by constitutional text. The First Amendment, for example,
expressly forbids government from abridging not only the "free-
dom of speech, or of the press," but equally "the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."109
In 1958, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme
Court held that the right to express one's views, when combined
with First Amendment rights to meet with others ("to assemble")
and to petition the government for change ("redress of griev-
ances"), meant there was a right to associate with others for po-
litical purposes."0 Justice Black did not dissent from the Court's
decision in Patterson, even though the Court recognized the "free-
105. For discussion of this objection, see Strauss, supra note 8, at 378-81.
106. Id. at 381.
107. SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 53, at 2 (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).
108. Id. (citing Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 61). My First Amendment students each year
enjoy the discovery, after reading Black's strenuous objections to any and all applications
of the Clear and Present Danger test and his rather literal basis for rejecting the whole
concept of unprotected "obscene" expression, Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 63, that the same
Justice Black joined a dissenting opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Cohen dissent, of course, dismissed Cohen's inflammatory
jacket-based expression as an "absurd and immature antic" that was "mainly conduct and
little speech." Id. at 27.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110. 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). The Court reasoned, moreover, that state law man-
dating disclosure of complete membership lists, including names, addresses, and so forth,
infringed on the "rights of [the NAACP's] rank-and-file members to engage in lawful asso-
ciation in support of their common beliefs." Id. at 460.
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dom of association" as "an independent right, possessing an equal
status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the first
amendment."111 There is no room for doubt that some rights, like
the right of political association, exist as implications of what it
means to recognize "other rights," such as the right to assemble,
to petition for redress of grievances, and the right of free speech.
It would in fact mean very little, as a practical matter, to have a
"right" to petition and assemble if the state possessed an unquali-
fied and legally enforceable state interest in obtaining, without
limitation, information about the membership of political organi-
zations. 112
In contrast to Ninth Amendment rights, however, there is no
inference contended that "unenumerated" fundamental rights
flow from the nature and substance of the rights secured by the
text. Rather, the inference on behalf of "unenumerated" funda-
mental rights flows from the very concept of constitutional rights.
The assumption is that every right that people reasonably
"should have," that limits government power in some way, in fact
does exist as a limit on government power as a consequence of the
"rights" assumptions underlying the social contract political the-
ory that undergirded the Constitution.'13 The only problem is that
the social contract political theory actually held by those who
drafted and ratified America's state constitutions assumed that
limits on government power in favor of fundamental rights would
have to be included in the written Constitution to serve as consti-
tutional limits on government power."' This is at least one rea-
son why American courts have not found particular constitutional
provisions, or perhaps constitutional amendments, to be "uncon-
111. Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1, 2 (1964).
112. For a treatment of the differences between deriving fundamental rights as a "nec-
essary condition" for the meaningful protection of an express right, in contrast to deriving
a fundamental right as supplying the "best justification" for a right found in the text, see
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Two Ways to Derive Implied Constitutional Rights, in LEGAL
INTERPRETATION IN DEMOCRATIC STATES 231 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds.,
2002) (explaining that the modern Court has sometimes appeared to justify securing un-
named rights as an implication of "republican" or constitutional government itself).
113. For evidence of the assumptions held by those who drafted the Constitution, see
McAffee, Prolegomena, supra note 27, at 168-69.
114. See id. at 167-69. The overwhelming evidence of the view of the framers, Federal-
ist and Anti-Federalist, about the powers of legislatures under the state constitutions con-
firm as well that these were their assumptions. See Courts Over Constitutions Revisited,
supra note 10, at 336-40.
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stitutional" violations of "rights.""5 Undue literalism is one thing;
the determination that courts hold a general power to "invent" or
"create" constitutional rights, according to their own sense of good
public policy or adequate "rights" analysis, is another. To hold
otherwise is to insist upon the ultimate sovereignty of America's
courts. 6
2. The Search for "Inalienable" Rights
It may well be, however, that Justice Black's larger opposition,
the one with greater validity, was not the idea that constitutional
values are sometimes derived from an implication as much as by
reliance on explicit text. Rather, his opposition may stem from his
concern that when the Court elaborates "the same natural law
due process philosophy found in Lochner,""7 it grants itself a vir-
tually open-ended mandate to secure as personal rights whatever
particular members of the Court want to deem fundamental."1
115. See Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 357.
116. See Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2393, 2415 (1992) (When judges determine the meaning and application of natural law,
"the system remains positivist in the most significant sense, with the judge simply serving
as the sovereign in place of the legislature.").
117. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). There is
not much question that some members of the Supreme Court-perhaps most starkly, Jus-
tice Field-wanted to read the Fourteenth Amendment as legally protecting the inalien-
able natural rights referred to in the Declaration of Independence. See Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 141-42 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS
AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 72 (Peter Smith ed.,
1976) (1960) (citing Justice Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack,
Address Before the Yale Law School (June 23, 1891), in 10 RAILWAY & CORP. L.J. 281, 283
(1891)); Bernstein, supra note 10, at 35-38; J. Roland Pennock, Introduction to NOMOS
XVIII, DUE PROCESS xv, xvii, xxii (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (re-
ferring to substantive due process as "constitutionalized natural law," as it is found in "a
blend of history, ideas of natural right, and the closely related philosophical concept of re-
spect for persons").
118. Justice Black's basic instinct was that Lochner-era decision-making had all too
often rested on the assumption-articulated in an ABA speech in 1892 by its President,
Judge Dillon-that only judges, or some equally elite group, could discern the "eternal and
indestructible sense of justice and right, written by God on the living tablets of the human
heart, and revealed in his Holy Word." PAUL, supra note 117, at 79 (quoting JOHN F. DIL-
LON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 17 (1894)). Judge Dillon
concluded that our written constitutions had "incorporated the moral law into the organic
limitations of government," including securing the "eternal" rights that were now "men-
aced both openly and covertly." Id. Hence, as we approached the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, direct reliance on the Declaration of Independence's "unalienable rights" became in-
creasingly common in the federal courts. Id. at 89; accord Bernstein, supra note 10, at 35-
38, 43 (asserting that "liberty of contract" is "among the inalienable rights of the citizen"
(quoting Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895))). A direct result was that,
whereas the standard question concerning challenged acts of legislation historically had
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Notwithstanding the tendency of some modern revisionists to at-
tribute the Lochner era with linking the due process limitation to
nineteenth-century prohibitions on "class legislation," my own re-
view of the literature supports the position that the Supreme
Court found some laws invaded "fundamental rights protected by
the Due Process Clause."" 9
As Professor David Bernstein has observed, many American
lawyers and judges thought of the Constitution "not as being
solely the powers and prohibitions contained within the four cor-
ners of a document," but as including unwritten principles that
"complemented and supplemented the written document." 120 It
was not uncommon for courts in this period to rely on "limitations
on [legislative] power which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments," and thus to refer to "[ilmplied reservations of
individual rights, without which the social compact could not ex-
ist. 12 ' From the Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases until the Lochner era was fully established, members of the
Court occasionally "assert[ed] that natural rights constituted an
inherent limit on government authority."' 22 Notwithstanding
their near-universal belief that their purpose was to secure rights
"antecedent to government," American judges also agreed that
American history "limited the scope of the judicial enforceability
of natural rights to those rights considered fundamental to the
Anglo-American heritage of liberty."'23
concerned the constitutional provision that it violated, increasingly the question became
whether the challenged statute had been authorized. PAUL, supra note 117, at 92 (citing
Richard C. McMurtrie, A New Canon of Constitutional Interpretation, 41 AM. L. REG. 1, 8-
9 (1893)); cf. Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 385-86 (describing the
negative reaction of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to this same reversal of the question to be
asked).
119. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 13. Professor Bernstein shows that anti-class legisla-
tion, which invoked the theme of avoiding "discriminating" laws that disparaged some citi-
zens, was an important Fourteenth Amendment idea, but was related to equal protection
and did not carry great bite in the period leading to Lochner. Id. at 14-21. Indeed, a "nar-
row understanding of class legislation carried the day" in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898), just a few years before Lochner, and again in Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183
U.S. 13 (1901). Id. at 22-23. Moreover, the Lochner opinion itself could easily have been
framed far more clearly in "class legislation" terms. Id. at 24-26.
120. Id. at 31; see also id. at 32-38.
121. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874). The case is discussed in
Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 353.
122. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 36.
123. Id. at 35, 37; see id. at 38. Professor Bernstein emphasizes, '[t]here was no set for-
mula for judges to determine what the essential rights of the American people were." Id.
Even so, the opinions generally combined "a fundamental rights analysis with a historicist
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Perhaps most of the failures of the Lochner era grew out of a
tendency to be so immersed in the "logic" of the cases and rules
that there was a failure to pay close attention to the facts of the
case. As Professor William Wiecek observes:
Classical method emphasized deduction and logic, rejecting empiri-
cal scientific or social science research. Such an approach led judges
to ignore inconvenient facts in a burlesque of the modern aphorism,
"My mind's made up; don't confuse me with the facts." The best-
known example is Justice Rufus Peckham's pontifical utterance dis-
missing proffered medical evidence in the Lochner case: "We do not
believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law." In
place of disciplined factual enquiry, judges would substitute their
own uninformed musings about social reality, as Peckham did about
the occupation of a baker. 124
One result was a heavy dependence on logic and a relative in-
difference to "social reality."125 Thinkers of the era believed that
"[t]he law's 'decisions come like the answer to an algebraic prob-
lem, without partiality."'126
Consequently, what may have infected the Lochner era of judi-
cial decision-making has little to do with literalism and much to
do with the confidence of the Court in asserting, and then con-
cluding, what was fundamental in America and what was univer-
sally fundamental. Relatedly, Reinhold Niebuhr, the thoughtful
and profound theologian, social, and political thinker, noted that
those most deeply committed to the decision-making of the
Lochner era "believed in a pre-established harmony in society,
akin to the harmony of non-historical nature which would guar-
antee justice if only governmental controls were reduced to mini-
mal terms." 12
7
perspective." Id. at 39. "Populist agitation of the period, which fueled fears of imminent
Socialism," helped generate demands for "constitutional protections for private enter-
prise." Id. at 41.
124. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 81 (footnote omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting CYRUS NORTHROP, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS A CONSERVATIVE FORCE
IN OUR REPUBLIC: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GRADUATING CLASSES AT THE
SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF YALE LAw SCHOOL ON JUNE 28, 1892 at 8 (New Haven,
Hoggson & Robinson 1892); see also Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,
458 (1909) (stating that the constitutionality of legislation is "tried by artificial criteria of
general application and prevents effective judicial investigation or consideration of the
situations of fact behind or bearing upon the statutes").
127. REINHOLD NIEBUHR ON POLITICS: HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS
APPLICATION TO OUR AGE AS EXPRESSED IN HIS WRITINGS 10 (Harry R. Davis & Robert C.
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Niebuhr was thus convinced that the era of economic substan-
tive due process suggested that the Supreme Court had mistaken
the enlightenment-era rationalism, which "enlarges the intensity
and extent of social cohesion in modern man's common life," for
the means by which humanity would achieve justice and social
peace. 12 The true believers and strongest advocates of economic
substantive due process shared a "liberal faith"-one believing
"that society is moving toward a universal community and a fric-
tionless harmony of all social life by forces inherent in history it-
self."'129 The consequence was a failure to perceive the moral am-
biguity inherent in modern political life. 3 ° Niebuhr, in fact,
contended that "political morality must be morally ambiguous be-
cause it cannot merely reject, but must also deflect, beguile, har-
ness and use self-interest for the sake of a tolerable harmony of
the whole." 3 ' Political morality is not only ambiguous by neces-
sity, it is also historically conditioned. 13 2 As Niebuhr argued,
"every precise definition of the requirements and the perils of
government is historically conditioned by the comparative dan-
gers of either a too strict order or of potential chaos in given peri-
ods of history."1
33
Good eds., 1960) [hereinafter NIEBUHR ON POLITICS]; cf. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra
note 15, at 884 (comparing Lochner-era decisions with the one in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court concluded that "the concept that government may re-
strict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Sunstein
contends that in both cases "the existing distribution of wealth is seen as natural, and
failure to act is treated as no decision at all," that "[nieutrality is inaction, reflected in a
refusal to intervene in markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth," and that
"the existing distribution of wealth must be taken as simply 'there,'" so that "efforts to
change that distribution are impermissible." Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at
884.
128. NIEBUHR ON POLITICS, supra note 127, at 5; id. at 9. Liberal culture, according to
Niebuhr, was infected with "too great an optimism about the goodness of human nature"
and a corresponding tendency to "underestimate the difficulties of relating life to life, will
to will, interest to interest, in a harmonious social life." Id.
129. Id. at 11.
130. See id. at 15, 19.
131. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENCE 73 (1944) (em-
phasis added); cf. Pound, supra note 126, at 460 (noting that "the growing period of Ameri-
can law coincided with the high tide of individualistic ethics and economics" and "the indi-
vidualist conception of justice reached its complete logical development after the doctrine
itself had lost its vitality").
132. NIEBUHR, supra note 131.
133. Id.
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One thing seems certain-among Lochner's critics, whether
economists, secular law professors, or theologians, the near-
universal criticism of the Court of that era was a certain "lack of
humility: an inability, or refusal, to understand that although
they were vindicating an important value, matters were more
complicated than they thought."134 Advocates of the world view
embodied in Lochner-era decision-making engaged in a "reduc-
tionist enterprise that sought to identify some minimal number of
fundamental principles, universally and at all times valid, to
which all law must conform."135 As the Court itself has acknowl-
edged recently, Lochner demonstrates that "there is reason for
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become
the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members
of this Court."136 The result is judicial supremacy.137
C. Due Process and Equal Protection
There is a tendency to assume that the constitutional limita-
tions set forth in the text are part of a logically interconnected
whole. A similar assumption appears to provide the only explana-
tion for the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause did not
protect homosexuals discriminated against because of their sex-
ual preference.13 Courts and commentators derived this conclu-
sion from the Supreme Court's refusal in Bowers v. Hardwick to
134. Strauss, supra note 8, at 386.
135. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 261. Writing as a contemporary early in the Lochner
era, Dean Pound concluded that "liberty of contract" reflected "[t]he absolute certainty
which is one of our legal ideals, an ideal responsible for much that is irritatingly mechani-
cal in our legal system," and which "is demanded chiefly to protect property." Pound, supra
note 126, at 461.
136. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). The concern is that Su-
preme Court Justices "are neither trained as political philosophers nor selected on that
basis." Conkle, supra note 92, at 114. Professor Conkle concludes, "For the Supreme Court
to make decisions simply on the basis of political-moral reasoning-acting, in effect, as a
'bevy of Platonic Guardians'-reflects an extravagant conception of the judicial role, one
that takes the Court well beyond the customary limits of judging." Id. (quoting LEARNED
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958)); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
137. See WIECEK, supra note 14, at 261 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61
(1905)).
138. E.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). After granting a rehearing, the court, sitting en banc, withdrew its opinion
and reinstated an earlier opinion of the district court, estopping the Army from "refusing
to reenlist Watkins on the basis of his homosexuality." Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d
699, 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1989). The court, however, did not reach the constitutional issues
raised in its 1988 decision. Id. at 705; see also Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1162.
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extend the constitutional right of privacy to encompass the right
to engage in sodomy.' 39
As Professor Cass Sunstein observes, however, the Court's
holding in Hardwick reflected that "[firom its inception the Due
Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not exclu-
sively) to protect traditional practices against short-run depar-
tures." 4 ' By contrast, the constitutional requirement of equality
before the law has long "been understood as an attempt to protect
disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however
deeply engrained and longstanding."14' So while the Due Process
Clause is by its nature "backward" looking, with the primary
question being whether "an existing or time-honored convention
... is violated by the practice under attack,".., the Equal Protec-
tion Clause "looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that
were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were ex-
pected to endure."142 If Professor Sunstein accurately perceives
that the "two clauses therefore operate along different tracks," it
would also follow that "statutes that are unaffected by the Due
Process Clause may be drawn into severe doubt by principles of
equal protection."' 43
To illustrate, compare the Supreme Court's holding in Hard-
wick' with the Ninth Circuit's 1988 ruling in Watkins v. U.S.
Army that a military discharge based exclusively on sexual pref-
erence violated the Equal Protection Clause. 4 5 Perry Watkins
enlisted in 1967 and, despite acknowledging "homosexual tenden-
cies" in a pre-induction medical form, was found qualified and
139. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
140. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1163. Sunstein relates this approach to substantive
due process to a view of judicial review as supplying a safeguard "against novel develop-
ments brought about by temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims
of history." Id. As Professor Marc Fajer noted, prior to establishing "broad unenumerated
limits on the powers of government, the Supreme Court often has been careful to demon-
strate that the particular claim is supported by a strong historical tradition." Marc A. Fa-
jer, With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 39, 40 (1994).
141. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1163.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1163-64.
144. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
145. 847 F.2d 1329, 1352 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn en banc, Watkins v. U.S. Army,
875 F.2d 699, 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (estopping the Army from denying reenlistment to a
soldier based on his homosexuality, but not addressing the constitutional issues raised in
its 1988 decision). The Watkins case is also used illustratively in Sunstein's article. Sun-
stein, supra note 82, at 1164-69.
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admitted into the Army.146 The Army board voted to discharge
Watkins in 1981 because of his revelation of his sexual orienta-
tion, but he was given the highest possible rating for his "per-
formance and professionalism."147
When the Ninth Circuit held that the discharge violated the
Equal Protection Clause, Judge Reinhardt based his dissent on
the belief that Hardwick controlled, despite finding it clear that
Hardwick was wrongly decided.14 He contended that "[w]hen
conduct that plays a central role in defining a group may be pro-
hibited by the state, it cannot be asserted with any legitimacy
that the group is specially protected by the Constitution."14 9 The
assumption was that it would be "illogical to hold that those who
engage in acts that can be criminalized might by virtue of that
fact qualify as a suspect class."5 ° Yet numerous equal protection
cases-the entire category, for example, of the "fundamental
rights"-equal protection case law-were "self-consciously designed
to prohibit states from drawing impermissible lines with respect
to rights that the Due Process Clause does not substantively pro-
tect."'51 It may be especially difficult in the post-legal realism era
to take seriously the idea that the Supreme Court could not up-
hold the prohibition of the very conduct that helped define a pre-
sumptively unlawful classification.
There is no question, however, that Hardwick did not consider,
and was not asked to consider, whether the challenged law vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court never received the
opportunity to review the history of discrimination against gays
and lesbians or the likelihood that the challenged law reflected
past and present prejudice based on sexual preference.152 Con-
trast the Supreme Court's oblivion to the history of discrimina-
146. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1330.
147. Id. at 1332-33.
148. Id. at 1358 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The judge went on, nonetheless, to contend
that the Court "egregiously misinterpreted" the Constitution in Hardwick, directly com-
paring it to the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1358 (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting).
149. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1357 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The court took the same ba-
sic approach in Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
150. Sunstein, supra note 82.
151. Id.
152. See ELY, supra note 7, at 162-64 (discussing prejudice towards and stereotypes of
homosexuals).
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tion and hostility toward gays and lesbians with Watkins's em-
phasis on that very history and its likely relationship to military
policy.'53 Equally important is:
The rationale accepted in Hardwick as sufficient for due process
purposes-relating principally to traditionally held moral norms-
has little or no weight in the context of an equal protection challenge;
consider the Court's rejection of such norms in the areas of race and
sex discrimination. The Watkins court also pointed to the peculiar
difficulty of using political avenues to seek redress and the usual ir-
relevance of sexual orientation to legitimate governmental goals. In
these respects, the pattern of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is strikingly analogous to the pattern of discrimination
against blacks. 154
D. Due Process and Anti-Sodomy Laws: The Case of Lawrence v.
Texas
The issue concerning how the Court should find fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause was raised again in 2003 in
Lawrence v. Texas.'55 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled
Hardwick and invalidated a Texas anti-sodomy law that prohib-
ited particular sexual conduct between persons of the same sex. 1
56
Some have read Lawrence as establishing either a broad funda-
mental right of intimate sexual conduct'57 or at least recognizing
a John Stuart Mill-like constitutional presumption in favor of lib-
erty. 58 Though Lawrence is a useful and healthy reminder that
the Due Process Clause "reflect[s] a 'tradition' that must be con-
ceived as 'a living thing,"'159 it should not be read either as estab-
153. See Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1345-49; see also Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1176.
154. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1176-77 (footnotes omitted); accord Fajer, supra note
140, at 39 ("At a doctrinal level, courts need not handle equal protection analysis with the
kind of caution appropriate for nontextual rights such as the right to privacy.").
155. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
156. Id. at 562, 578.
157. E.g., James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563, 571, 575
(2004).
158. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 40-41; see also Fleming, supra note 157, at 574.
For a less enthusiastic reaction than Professor Barnett's, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our
Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court's Repudiation of Immorality as a Ground of
Criminal Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 407, 414 (2004).
159. Post, supra note 7, at 54 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that "[a] deci-
sion of this Court which radically departs from [that tradition] could not long survive,
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound"). Lawrence thus
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lishing a new, expansive fundamental right of intimate sexual
conduct or as recognizing a presumption of liberty that would pre-
clude society from using its police power to promote society's
moral values.
As a Due Process Clause holding, the Court's decision in Law-
rence "is best seen as a successor to Griswold v. Connecticut,"160
and as involving the "judicial invalidation of a law that had be-
come hopelessly out of touch with existing social convictions."
161
Just as the Court in Griswold invalidated a law "that was ludi-
crously inconsistent with public convictions in Connecticut and
throughout the nation,"162 Lawrence is a part of "a civil rights
revolution" which had already succeeded in "delegitimating
prejudice against and hatred for homosexuals."1 63 The reason
there is room for doubt whether Lawrence should even be called a
"fundamental rights" decision, or instead, a "rational basis" re-
view, 1" is precisely because the challenged prohibition of private
sexual conduct confronted the problem of "[ ] desuetude, Ameri-
can style," in that "enforcement of the relevant law can no longer
claim to have significant moral support in the enforcing state or
the nation as a whole." 6 ' "Given that ... criminal laws in this
illustrates that implementing substantive due process is not a "mechanical exercise of iso-
lating 'fundamental rights' as though they were a historically given set of data points on a
two-dimensional grid." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right"
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
160. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)).
161. Id. Indeed, at least one prominent constitutional theorist has suggested that Law-
rence is best read as articulating a new, third alternative theory-in addition to "historical
tradition" and "reasoned judgment"-of "Evolving National Values" as the appropriate
theory of substantive due process. Conkle, supra note 92, at 82, 123-45; see id. at 133, 141,
144-45 (suggesting that an evolving values approach, with its requirement of a "contem-
porary national consensus," would enable courts "to operate in relative harmony with the
principle of majoritarian self-government," even as "it constrains the Court's discretion in
a manner that honors the criterion of judicial objectivity and competence").
162. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 28. As Professor Wellington observed, the statute
challenged in Griswold was enacted in 1879, and the passage of time properly "eliminated
any deference that the Court might have paid toward the legislature's interpretation of
public morality." HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 90 (1990).
163. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 29.
164. For useful analysis of why Lawrence is properly read as concerning a basic right,
notwithstanding its sometimes confusing language, see id. at 29-30.
165. Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted). As Professor Conkle asserts:
When societal thinking changes to the point of creating a national consensus,
no less than when a national consensus is longstanding, there is reason to be-
lieve that the liberty embraced by that consensus is worthy of recognition as
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field have notoriously been honored in the breach and, almost
from the start, have languished without enforcement," only an
exercise of "grossly stereotyped roles," used to justify treating
some individuals "less well than others," explains the prosecu-
tions that produced the Lawrence case.'66
As soon as we recognize that the Court's treatment of the sod-
omy prohibition was based on its conclusion that such laws are
anachronistic, 167 several features that otherwise seem mysterious
suddenly seem plain enough. For example, the risk of the abusive
use of such laws-invariably a risk for criminal laws that, for a
variety of reasons, may be too costly to be consistently enforced-
is especially powerful when one realizes that "the very fact of
criminalization, even unaccompanied by any appreciable number
of prosecutions, can cast already misunderstood or despised indi-
viduals into grossly stereotyped roles." 6 ' Such laws, then, are not
only anachronistic, but are harmfully so. The Supreme Court's
conclusion that the Texas sodomy statute presented a harmfully
anachronistic law sheds critical light on the Court's assertion that
"'the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.""69
A governing majority almost certainly viewed interracial co-
habitation, 7 ' let alone marriages prohibited by anti-misce-
genation laws, 7' as immoral at the time legislative prohibitions
were enacted. But, merely invoking a conventional ground for us-
ing state police powers does not liberate a state from its duty to
refrain from enacting racially discriminatory laws or unaccepta-
bly creating "classes" of citizenship in violation of its duty to sup-
ply equal protection of the law. Though courts have long recog-
nized the legitimacy of government acting to preserve and protect
public morality,'72 when the Court viewed the law challenged in
a matter of political morality-perhaps not universally, but at least in the
contemporary United States.
Conkle, supra note 92, at 140.
166. Tribe, supra note 159, at 1896.
167. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003).
168. Tribe, supra note 159, at 1896 (footnote omitted).
169. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
170. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
171. See Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
172. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
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Lawrence as anachronistic, we understand how the Court's own
prior holdings perceiving limits to basic liberty rights have been
based on the Court's willingness to sustain society's commitment
to its moral values. 
173
The Supreme Court has not previously, and should not now,
adopt a Millian "harm principle" 174 as a constitutional limit on
the police powers of the states. John Hart Ely was correct when
he suggested that if there is anything we can be grateful for to
the Lochner-era Court, it is that, as to the rational basis test,
"they misapplied it." 175 It is generally recognized that a central
characteristic of Lochner-era jurisprudence was the willingness of
the Court to conclude that certain legislative "ends" could not
constitutionally be pursued. 7 6 If the Supreme Court consistently
were to, in any case involving an individual's claimed liberty in-
terest, shift the burden of proof to the State to demonstrate an
adequate state purpose to justify the restriction on liberty, we
would find ourselves thrown back into the Lochner era. Perhaps
our most respected single-volume treatise on constitutional law
said this about Lawrence:
Perhaps the most important question left open by Lawrence is
whether, in 2003, there was a majority of the Justices on the Su-
preme Court who would be willing to consider all forms of economic
and social welfare legislation under a true reasonableness test. If the
Court were to make independent judgments as to whether any and
623, 660-61 (1887); Clor, supra note 17, at 155-56.
173. The classic example is the Court's recognition that obscenity is not expression pro-
tected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (States may continue to limit "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to
the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (Obscene utterances "are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter-
est in order and morality." (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942))). See generally Clor, supra note 17 (noting that in order to achieve a "balanced re-
public," "elements of the public good" had to be in James Madison's words, "'mingl[ed]
together').
174. See generally Fleming, supra note 157, at 574.
175. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 941 (1973).
176. It has been argued that "it is the insistence on a general power of courts to deter-
mine the appropriate 'ends' that government might legitimately and constitutionally pur-
sue that most singularly characterizes an activist judiciary, whether in 1905 or 2005."
Courts Over Constitutions Revisited, supra note 10, at 387. See generally Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1972).
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every law limiting individual autonomy was reasonably related to a
legitimate interest, we would have a complete return to the form of
judicial review that was used by the Court during the period from
the mid-1890s until 1937.177
The other thing to be aware of is that "Lawrence's words sound
in due process, but much of its music involves equal protec-
tion."178 Indeed, there is much to be said in support of Professor
Sunstein's view:
Rather than invalidating the Texas statute on grounds of substan-
tive due process, the Court should have invoked the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down, as irrational, the state's decision to ban ho-
mosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. In important re-
spects, this approach would have been more cautious than the
Court's own. It would have had the large advantage of making it un-
necessary to overrule any precedent. At the same time, an equal pro-
tection ruling would have recognized the fact, established by the
Court's opinions, that the Equal Protection Clause does not build on
long-standing traditions, but instead rejects them insofar as they at-
tempt to devalue or humiliate certain social groups. The problem in
Lawrence is not adequately understood without reference to the so-
cial subordination of gays and lesbians, not least through the use of
the criminal law. 1
79
The real theme of the Fourteenth Amendment is equal citizen-
ship, and equality before the law is its one undisputable pur-
pose. 180 If there were a provision under which any thoughtful con-
stitutional framer might legitimately have anticipated a clash
between the requirements of the constitutional text and the as-
177. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITuTIONAL LAw § 14.28, at 936
(7th ed. 2004).
178. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 30. As Professor Tribe observed, "this reductionist
conflation of ostracized identity with outlawed act in turn reinforces the vicious cycle of
distancing and stigma that preserves the equilibrium of oppression in one of the several
distinct dynamics at play in the legal construction of social hierarchy." Tribe, supra note
159, at 1896; see also SAGER, supra note 8, at 224 ("[Tlhere is an unmistakable echo of the
anthem sounded in the elder Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 'There is no
caste here.'"); Fleming, supra note 157, at 573 (comparing Kennedy's opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which treated the challenged provision "as reflecting unconsti-
tutional animus against a politically unpopular group," with Lawrence's "same move,
though it grounds its holding in the Due Process Clause rather than equal protection");
Post, supra note 7, at 97 ("Themes of respect and stigma are at the moral center of the
Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due process doctrine.").
179. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 32.
180. See generally McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 31, at 785-92. For addi-
tional strong support for the view that equality before the law is at the center of the Four-
teenth Amendment, see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
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sumptions entertained by many engaged in our constitutional
culture, it would be the clause in section 1 requiring, but not
really defining, substantively "equal laws."18' The most straight-
forward way to justify the Court's decision in Lawrence, then,
would be to see the challenged sodomy statute as creating a
"'status-based classification of persons undertaken for its own
sake,"' and therefore as presenting the sort of "animus" that "rep-
resent core offenses of the equal protection guarantee." 1 2
181. See Harrison, supra note 180, at 1387 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). The
Constitution does not contain a provision that open-endedly promises to secure "liberty"
interests. It may well be that the "equal laws" requirement was intended to be secured by
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, considering in particular that section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment explicitly recognizes the right of states to deny or "abridge" the right of
the freedmen to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See generally Harrison, supra note
180. The evidence is overwhelming, in any event, that the Framers believed that they
meaningfully could require "equal laws," so the Court's aggressive stand in Lawrence, even
when using "heightened" rationality review, Sunstein, supra note 160, at 34, makes a
great deal more sense than to vastly expand the liberty rights and interests of American
citizens.
182. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 37 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621
(1996)).
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